McChrystal Set To Resign, Afghan War In Trouble

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General McChrystal Ready To Resign, Sources Say



Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, is prepared to offer his resignation over disparaging comments made by him and his aides about Obama administration officials, NBC News has learned.

President Barack Obama said Tuesday that McChrystal displayed "poor judgment" and summoned him to the White House on Wednesday to hear from him first-hand and consider whether to fire him.

If not insubordination, the remarks in a forthcoming Rolling Stone magazine article were at least an indirect challenge to civilian management of the war in Washington by its top military commander.

"I think it's clear that the article in which he and his team appeared showed a poor — showed poor judgment," the president said Tuesday, surrounded by members of his Cabinet at the close of their meeting. "But I also want to make sure that I talk to him directly before I make any final decisions."

According to two senior administration aides, McChrystal informed his superiors that he is prepared to offer his resignation but had not done so, NBC News reported.

‘Significant mistake’

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said McChrystal had "made a significant mistake" in participating in the Rolling Stone profile in which aides called one top Obama official a "clown" and another a "wounded animal" and the general himself made disparaging remarks about officials.

McChrystal was quoted saying he was "betrayed" by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, his diplomatic partner in Afghanistan. He accused Eikenberry of raising doubts about the reliability of Afghan President Hamid Karzai only to give himself cover in case the U.S. effort failed.

McChrystal publicly apologized Tuesday for using "poor judgment" in interviews for the magazine. He then left Afghanistan to fly to Washington for Wednesday's meeting with the commander in chief.

Presidential spokesman Robert Gibbs said Obama acknowledged McChrystal's apology and believed he deserved a chance to explain himself. A decision on McChrystal's future will be announced by the White House after Wednesday's meeting, Gibbs said.

Wisconsin Democrat Rep. David Obey, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, called for McChrystal to resign. Sen. John McCain, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee that approved McChrystal for the job, was among three prominent Republican senators to criticize the general and say a decision about his future should rest with Obama.

McChrystal to lead the Afghan war in May 2009. Despite a continuing troop buildup, progress has been halting, with U.S. casualties rising, public support waning and tensions growing between Washington and Kabul.

The first victim in the controversy was the Pentagon's PR official who set up the interview with McChrystal. NBC reported that Duncan Boothby, a civilian member of the general's public relations team, was "asked to resign."

Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he had confidence in McChrystal's ability as a general. However, he said the issue was whether the article would impact his ability to have a relationship with Obama and the rest of the national security staff.

Kerry, speaking on MSNBC's "Daily Rundown," declined to say whether McChrystal should step down.

McChrystal, for his part, on Tuesday issued a statement saying: "I have enormous respect and admiration for President Obama and his national security team, and for the civilian leaders and troops fighting this war and I remain committed to ensuring its successful outcome."

"I extend my sincerest apology for this profile," the statement said. "It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened."

McChrystal spent Tuesday calling those mentioned in the article to apologize, officials said. Among those was Holbrooke. It was not clear whether the general had spoken directly to Obama.

Holbrooke's office said in a terse two-line statement that McCrystal had called him in Kabul "to apologize for this story and accept full responsibility for it." It said Holbrooke "values his close and productive relationship with General McChrystal."

Lone wolf?

The Rolling Stone article depicts McChrystal as a lone wolf on the outs with many important figures in the Obama administration and unable to persuade even some of his own soldiers that his strategy can win the war.

The interview describes McChrystal, 55, as "disappointed" in his first Oval Office meeting with Obama. The article says that although McChrystal voted for Obama, the two failed to connect from the start. Obama appointed McChrystal to lead the Afghan effort in May 2009. Last fall, though, Obama called McChrystal on the carpet for speaking too bluntly about his desire for more troops.

"I found that time painful," McChrystal said in the article. "I was selling an unsellable position."

The Rolling Stone Mag. article also reported:

One anonymous aide said McChrystal seized control of the war "by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House."

One aide called White House National Security Adviser Jim Jones, a retired four star general, a "clown" who was "stuck in 1985."

On Holbrooke, an aide is quoted saying: "The Boss says he's like a wounded animal. Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he's going to be fired, so that makes him dangerous." McChrystal is also described as exasperated on receiving an e-mail from Holbrooke. "Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke. I don’t even want to open it."

Obama agreed to dispatch an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan only after months of study that many in the military found frustrating. And the White House's troop commitment was coupled with a pledge to begin bringing them home in July 2011, in what counterinsurgency strategists advising McChrystal regarded as an arbitrary deadline.

McChrystal's team disapproves of the Obama administration, with the exception of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who backed McCrystal's request for additional troops in Afghanistan.

A member of McChrystal's team making jokes about Vice President Joe Biden, who was seen as critical of the general's efforts to escalate the conflict and who had favored a more limited counter-terrorism approach. "Biden?" the aide was quoted as saying. "Did you say: Bite me?" Biden initially opposed McChrystal's proposal for additional forces last year. He favored a narrower focus on hunting terrorists.

The profile, titled "The Runaway General," emerged from several weeks of interviews and travel with McChrystal's tight circle of aides this spring.

In the interview, McChrystal said he felt betrayed Ambassador Eikenberry. If Eikenberry had the same doubts, McChrystal said he never expressed them until a leaked internal document threw a wild card into the debate over whether to add more troops last November. In the document, Eikenberry said Karzai was not a reliable partner for the counterinsurgency strategy McChrystal was trying to execute.

McChrystal accused the ambassador of giving himself cover.

"Here's one that covers his flank for the history books," McChrystal told the magazine. "Now, if we fail, they can say 'I told you so.'"

McChrystal has a history of drawing criticism, despite his military achievements.

In June 2006, then President George W. Bush congratulated McChrystal for his role in the operation that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. As head of the special operations command, McChrystal's forces included the Army's clandestine counterterrorism unit, Delta Force.

He drew criticism for his role in the military's handling of the friendly fire shooting of Army Ranger Pat Tillman — a former NFL star — in Afghanistan. An investigation at the time found that McChrystal was "accountable for the inaccurate and misleading assertions" contained in papers recommending that Tillman get a Silver Star award.

McChrystal acknowledged he had suspected several days before approving the Silver Star citation that Tillman might have died by fratricide, rather than enemy fire. He sent a memo to military leaders warning them of that, even as they were approving Tillman's Silver Star. Still, he told investigators he believed Tillman deserved the award.

Last October, McChrystal tangled publicly with Biden over Afghan war strategy, dismissing Biden's idea of a narrow counterterrorism approach as "short-sighted." Obama, in Denmark at the time, called him in for what sources said was a dressing down aboard Air Force One.

Several names circulated among Pentagon and Capitol Hill aides as potential successors. They include Gen. James Mattis, Joint Forces Command chief; Lt. Gen. John Allen, the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command; Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, McChrystal's No. 2 in Afghanistan; Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command; and Adm. James Stavridis, the top NATO commander in Europe.


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Sources: CNN, MSNBC, Rolling Stone, Google Maps

"Troops To Teachers"...New Jobs Program For Veterans

Troops Finding New Service as Teachers


In her last job in the Air Force, Tammie Langley gave prospective pilots and navigators an introduction to aeronautics. Four years later, Ms. Langley is in a different sort of classroom, teaching sixth graders in North Carolina everything from reading to math.


The settings may be radically different, but Ms. Langley said the transition from teaching 22-year-olds to teaching 11- or 12-year-olds had been fairly seamless. “Either way, you still have to kind of wipe their noses a bit and kick them in the behind every now and then,” said Ms. Langley, who is in her second year at Kannapolis Intermediate School, about 25 miles north of Charlotte.

Ms. Langley, 36, became a schoolteacher in large part because of Troops to Teachers, a federal program that, over 15 years, has helped about 12,000 former service members transition into second careers in the classroom. Now, a bipartisan group in Congress is hoping to expand the program to allow more veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to sign up, while also increasing the number of places in which they could find employment.

Not all of the veterans who enter the classroom with the help of Troops to Teachers, some of whom are up to a generation older than teachers starting right out of college, share Ms. Langley’s background in formal instruction. But the program’s supporters and participants say that military service in general provides the sort of discipline and life experiences that translate well to teaching.

“My very first sergeant said, ‘Practice doesn’t make perfect,’ ” said Moises Perez, 50, a social studies teacher in Clayton County, Ga., who spent nearly 24 years in the Army, including service in Afghanistan. “He said, ‘Perfect practice makes perfect.’ That’s what I want to teach the kids.”

C. Emily Feistritzer, president of the National Center for Education Information, said: “We’re finding that these teachers seem to be able to really manage a classroom from the start, which is the biggest problem a lot of teachers have going in. And they come in thinking all children can learn, without any sort of socioeconomic biases.”

These teachers are also a more diverse group than the general teaching population. Men have accounted for about 80 percent of the program’s participants, while 35 percent or so have been members of minorities. The program, which is run by the Defense Department but financed by the Education Department, also encourages participants to teach math, science and special education, areas in which school districts can have the toughest time filling teaching slots.

William P. McAleer, who runs Troops to Teachers, said teaching math and science was sort of a natural progression for the many veterans who worked highly technical jobs in the service. “They’ve lived this stuff,” he said. “They bring real-life experience to these subjects.”

With all that in mind, supporters on Capitol Hill are pushing to expand the program by letting more service members participate and increasing the number of districts where they can teach. Legislation introduced in the House and Senate in October would allow candidates with four years of service or three months of continuous active duty since the Sept. 11 attacks to participate. As it stands, six years of active duty is needed to sign up.

Two leading sponsors of the House bill — Representatives Tom Petri, Republican of Wisconsin, and Joe Courtney, Democrat of Connecticut — said the program, which was created while the military was downsizing, needed to be updated to account for service members returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. (The Senate version of the bill was introduced by Senators John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Michael Bennet, Democrat of Colorado.)

“We have a large number of returning vets who don’t fit the model of the original program,” Mr. Courtney said. “These are people who have a lot to offer, but just can’t right now.”

The proposed legislation would also allow participants to teach in a larger number of schools. Right now, veterans who sign up with Troops to Teachers receive a stipend of up to $5,000 to help them obtain a teaching certificate, in exchange for a three-year commitment at high-need schools. Candidates who go to schools with even higher poverty rates receive a maximum of $10,000.

With the health care debate still front and center, it is uncertain how much attention Congress will give a Troops to Teachers expansion. But the House bill has already collected roughly 75 co-sponsors, while the American Legion and the National Education Association have also endorsed expanding the program.

Back in Kannapolis, Ms. Langley is also quick to sing the program’s praises.

“Without it, I would not have been able to make it financially,” said Ms. Langley, who also flew combat missions in Afghanistan in her nine years in the service. “And a three-year commitment is nothing. My kids are some of the best on the planet.”



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Sources: NY Times, Google Maps

When Will Pres. Obama End Afghan War?...Our Troops Are Not Political Pawns

When will Pres. Obama announce end of the Afghan War? Our Soldiers should not be used for Political gain or to prove that George W. Bush was wrong. Karzai can't be trusted thus the Afghan War is a losing battle just like Vietnam. Pres. Obama please keep your Campaign Promise and bring our troops home.

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First Lady Michelle Obama pays an emotional tribute to Military Women.

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Sources: MSNBC

Hasan Possibly Paralyzed, Wired Money To Pakistan...Home Grown Terrorist

Hasan charged with 13 counts of murder. Military officials announce they will pursue 13 counts of Premeditated Murder against accused Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal Malik Hasan.

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Lawyer believes Hasan is Paralyzed after attack


The Army psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people in a shooting spree at Fort Hood made or accepted wire transfers with Pakistan, a country wracked by Muslim extremist violence, a Republican congressman said Friday.

Texas Rep. Michael McCaul, the ranking GOP member of the House Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee, said people outside the intelligence community with direct knowledge of the transfers also told him Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan also had communications with Pakistan.

“He may have friends or relatives or whatever and this could be totally (innocent),” McCaul said in a telephone interview. “But if he is wiring money to Pakistan, that could be terrorist financing. If he was receiving money from Pakistan, that is more significant.”

McCaul said he does not know the direction of the transfers and communications, only that they passed between Hasan and Pakistan. He said the lack of additional information is why Congress should launch an investigation.

Hasan, 39, was charged Thursday with 13 counts of premeditated murder in a military court, and Army investigators have said he could face additional charges. His attorney, John Galligan, has said prosecutors have not yet told him whether they plan to seek the death penalty.

Could be Paralyzed

A pair of civilian police officers responding to last week’s attack, in which 43 people were also injured, including 34 with gunshot wounds, shot Hasan four times. Recovering in the intensive care unit at San Antonio’s Brooke Army Medical Center, Hasan has told his attorney he has no feeling in his legs and extreme pain in his hands.

Galligan said doctors have told Hasan he may be permanently paralyzed from the waist down. He called his client’s medical condition “extremely serious” and said Hasan didn’t flinch when Galligan touched his leg during a meeting Thursday, when one of Hasan’s relatives was able to see him for the first time since he was hospitalized.

Hospital spokesman Dewey Mitchell said he could not confirm whether Hasan was paralyzed, since Hasan has directed hospital officials not to release any information about his condition or injuries.

The question of how Hasan spent his Army salary stems from the apparently frugal lifestyle he lived both in the small city of Killeen, Texas, outside of Fort Hood, and in the Washington, D.C., suburbs when stationed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. In Texas, he lived in a rundown apartment that cost $350 a month and drove a 2006 Honda.

As an Army major with more than 12 years of service, Hasan earns just over $92,000 a year in basic pay and housing and food allowances, according to pay tables from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Hasan’s gross monthly salary is $6,325.50 a month, or $75,906 annually. He also gets $1,128 a month for a housing allowance and $223 a month for meals, which adds up to another $16,212 a year.

Pres. Obama orders review of Hasan files

Military psychiatrists may also receive as much as $20,000 a year in incentive pay, according to the tables. But to get the bonus, they must meet certain requirements, such as agreeing to remain on active duty for at least one year after accepting the award. Hasan’s Army records are sealed due to the ongoing investigation, and it isn’t clear if he was eligible for the bonus or agreed to the conditions.

President Barack Obama has ordered a review of all intelligence related to Hasan and whether the information was properly shared and acted upon within government agencies. Several members of Congress, particularly Michigan Rep. Peter Hoekstra, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, have also called for a full examination of what agencies knew about Hasan’s contacts with a radical Muslim cleric in Yemen and others of concern to the U.S.

Hoekstra confirmed this week that government officials knew about 10 to 20 e-mails between Hasan and the radical imam, beginning in December 2008.

A joint terrorism task force overseen by the FBI learned late last year of Hasan’s repeated contact with the cleric, who encouraged Muslims to kill U.S. troops in Iraq. The FBI said the task force did not refer early information about Hasan to superiors because it concluded he wasn’t linked to terrorism.






Fort Hood shootings suspect may have wired money to Pakistan


Authorities have been examining whether Fort Hood massacre suspect Nidal Malik Hasan wired money to Pakistan in recent months, an action that one senior lawmaker said would raise serious questions about Hasan's possible connections to militant Islamic groups.

Rep. Pete Hoekstra, R-Mich., said sources "outside of the [intelligence] community" learned about Hasan's possible connections to the Asian country, which faces a massive Islamist insurgency and is widely believed to be Osama bin Laden's hiding place.

Hoekstra, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, would not identify the sources. But he said "they are trying to follow up on it because they recognize that if there are communications – phone or money transfers with somebody in Pakistan – it just raises a whole other level of questions."

Much remains unknown about the 39-year-old Hasan, born in Virginia to Palestinian immigrants. He lived alone near the Army base in Killeen, Texas, and would sometimes use a neighbor's computer even though he had his own.

"With what I know about Hasan to date ... I would expect we will learn more about him that will make us concerned," Hoekstra said, "rather than information that says, 'Oh man, we got that all wrong and this had nothing to do with terrorism.' "

Mystery of Money

Hasan's finances have been a mystery since last week, when the Army major and psychiatrist allegedly shot and killed 13 colleagues at the sprawling Central Texas military base. Hasan earned more than $90,000 a year and had no dependents, yet lived in an aging one-bedroom apartment that rented for about $300 a month.

"You can bet there is an ongoing, extensive investigation into every single financial transaction he made," said Matt Orwig, a former U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Texas who has no direct knowledge of the Hasan case. "Federal investigative agencies are very good at tracing the flow of money, both to him and from him."

Authorities know that Hasan sent repeated e-mails, starting some time in December 2008, to a radical Muslim cleric in Yemen. That cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, formerly served as imam of a large northern Virginia mosque where Hasan worshipped. The U.S.-born cleric praised Hasan after the massacre as "a hero."

In January, al-Awlaki told readers of his blog about "44 ways to support jihad" – a term often translated as "holy war." Many of his points dealt with ways to fund such efforts.

"Probably the most important contribution the Muslims of the West could do for Jihad is making Jihad with their wealth," al-Awlaki wrote. "In many cases the mujahideen are in need of money more than they are in need of men."

He also stressed the importance of "avoiding the life of luxury."

A spokesman for the U.S. Justice Department referred questions Wednesday to the FBI, which didn't return a message seeking comment. FBI officials have said they studied Hasan's communications with an unnamed radical Muslim and concluded they were a harmless part of his academic research.

Hoekstra said he wants to know whether authorities knew about Hasan's behavior when they decided his contacts with the Yemeni imam were essentially harmless.

"The conclusion based off just the e-mails might have been perfectly legitimate," Hoekstra said. "But if the [terrorism] analyst for some reason didn't have access to all this other information, that might be where the problem is."

Strange, lonely guy

Some of Hasan's former colleagues in the Washington area said his behavior raised red flags that should have been addressed. While pursuing a master's degree in public health, Hasan lectured a class about suicide bombers and the conflicts faced by Muslim U.S. soldiers fighting against other Muslims.

Doctors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, where Hasan trained and studied, questioned whether he was mentally unstable and a possible danger to fellow soldiers, according to National Public Radio. Discussions began in spring 2008 and continued over the next year.

"Put it this way," NPR quoted one unnamed source as saying, "everybody felt that if you were deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, you would not want Nidal Hasan in your foxhole."

S. Ward Casscells, former assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, told The Dallas Morning News that Hasan had trouble connecting with patients and colleagues at Walter Reed.

"Doctors at Walter Reed I worked with say he was a strange and lonely guy who did not really earn the trust of his patients and fellow doctors," said Casscells, vice president for external affairs and public policy at the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston. "They attribute that to his personality, not to religious discrimination."

Despite concerns about Hasan, his views and his poor job performances, the consensus was to send him to Fort Hood after he finished his medical training, The Associated Press reported. Fort Hood was considered the best assignment for Hasan because other doctors could handle the workload if he continued to perform poorly, and his superiors could document any continued behavior problems, the AP quoted an unnamed military official familiar with the discussion as saying.

Family members said shortly after last week's rampage that Hasan opposed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wanted out the Army and had sought legal advice. But Pentagon officials said they found nothing to indicate that Hasan formally sought to leave the Army, the AP said.

Even if Hasan had sought a discharge, the Army almost certainly would have denied it, senior Army officials told The Washington Post. Hasan had a continuing obligation to the Army because it provided his medical training and promoted him in May to the rank of major.

Colleagues and associates have described Hasan as a loner who voiced his opposition to the wars, including his assertion that Muslims were justified in fighting American troops. Hasan's family has said he became more distressed as he learned he was about to be deployed to Afghanistan.

"He is a kind of fundamentalist. He thinks a Muslim must defend themselves," said Golam Akhter, a civil engineer from Bethesda, Md., who said he spoke with Hasan on several occasions at the mosque where they worshipped.

He said he knew Hasan was a doctor but didn't know he was a member of the Army.

"He used to dress in long dresses just like Pakistanis, and that made me also concerned," Akhter said. "Usually only the imam uses those loose and long shirts and sleeves. That made me [wonder], being very educated, why he is using the imam's dress."

Hard trail to follow?

Matthew Levitt, director of counterterrorism and intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said wire transfers to Pakistan would be "extremely significant in terms of a potential network for this particular case."

Tracing money to Pakistan could be easy if Hasan used a formal bank or wire service. It would be more difficult if he sent money under another name or used an informal channel known as hawala that is popular in Pakistan and doesn't involve paperwork.

"If it turns out the person was radicalized to the point he was sending money to other insurgents or other terrorists, that takes it to another level still," Levitt said.



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Sources: Dallas News, MSNBC, Fox News, McClatchy Newspapers, Charlotte Observer, Google Maps

Doctors Questioned Hasan's Weird Behavior, US Military Officials Ignored Warning Signs

Report: No formal complaints filed against Hasan. Pentagon officials said Wednesday that suspected Fort Hood gunman Maj. Nidal Hasan's superiors had no idea he was e-mailing a radical Islamic sheikh nearly a year ago, and that while his colleagues had voiced concerns about his mental stability, they never filed formal complaints. NBC's Justice Correspondent Pete Williams reports.

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Fingerpointing begins over Fort Hood shooting suspect's motive.

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Doctors questioned Hasan's behavior


A group of doctors overseeing Nidal Malik Hasan's medical training discussed concerns about his overly zealous religious views and strange behavior months before the Army major was accused of opening fire on soldiers and civilians at Fort Hood, Texas, The Associated Press and NPR News reported Wednesday.

A military official familiar with discussions about Hasan said Hasan as a psychiatrist in training was belligerent, defensive and argumentative in his frequent discussions of his Muslim faith. He also had a reputation for being a mediocre student and lazy worker, a matter of concern for doctors at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences military medical school, the official said.

The military source spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because the source was not authorized to speak publicly about the meetings.

The concerns about Hasan’s performance and religious views were shared with other military officials considering his assignment after he finished his medical training, and the consensus was to send him to Fort Hood, the official said. Fort Hood was considered the best assignment for Hasan because other doctors could handle the workload if he continued to perform poorly and his superiors could document any continued behavior problems, the official said.

The group saw no evidence that Hasan was violent or a threat. It was more that he repeatedly referred to his strong religious views in discussions with classmates, his superiors and even in his research work, the official said.

His behavior, while at times perceived as intense and combative, was not unlike the zeal of others with strong religious views, and some doctors and staff were concerned that their unfamiliarity with the Muslim faith would lead them to unfairly single out Hasan’s behavior, the official said.

But NPR News reported that the doctors discussed Hasan during a series of meetings between spring 2008 and spring 2009, and at one point talked about whether he was "psychotic" and mentally fit to be an Army psychiatrist.

One official involved in the conversations reportedly told colleagues that he worried that if Hasan deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, he might leak secret military information to Islamic extremists, according to NPR. Another official reportedly wondered aloud to colleagues whether Hasan might be capable of committing fratricide, like the Muslim U.S. Army Sgt. Hasan Akbar, who killed 14 fellow soldiers in 2003 by setting off grenades at a base in Kuwait.

Poor Evaluations

Several officials told NPR that supervisors had repeatedly given Hasan poor evaluations and warned him that he was doing substandard work during his training at Walter Reed.

The sources told NPR that both fellow students and faculty were deeply troubled by Hasan's behavior, which they variously described as disconnected, aloof, paranoid, belligerent and "schizoid."

The disclosures came as questions swirled about whether opportunities were missed to head off the massacre in which 13 died and 29 were wounded at Fort Hood last Thursday.

The Senate already has launched its own inquiry into the Hasan case. Sens. Joe Lieberman, a Connecticut independent, and Susan Collins, R-Maine, plan to hold a hearing on the shootings next week.




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Sources: MSNBC, Google Maps

2,266 Uninsured Veterans Died In 2008...This Is Unacceptable!

Over 2,200 veterans died in 2008 due to lack of Health Insurance



Harvard researchers say 1.46 million working-age vets lacked health coverage last year, increasing their death rate

Immediate Release
Nov. 10, 2009

Contacts:

Steffie Woolhandler, M.D., M.P.H.
David Himmelstein, M.D.
Mark Almberg, Physicians for a National Health Program, (312) 782-6006, mark@pnhp.org

A research team at Harvard Medical School estimates 2,266 U.S. military veterans under the age of 65 died last year because they lacked health insurance and thus had reduced access to care. That figure is more than 14 times the number of deaths (155) suffered by U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2008, and more than twice as many as have died (911 as of Oct. 31) since the war began in 2001.

The researchers, who released their analysis today [Tuesday], pointedly say the health reform legislation pending in the House and Senate will not significantly affect this grim picture.

The Harvard group analyzed data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s March 2009 Current Population Survey, which surveyed Americans about their insurance coverage and veteran status, and found that 1,461,615 veterans between the ages of 18 and 64 were uninsured in 2008. Veterans were only classified as uninsured if they neither had health insurance nor received ongoing care at Veterans Health Administration (VA) hospitals or clinics.

Using their recently published findings in the American Journal of Public Health that show being uninsured raises an individual’s odds of dying by 40 percent (causing 44,798 deaths in the United States annually among those aged 17 to 64), they arrived at their estimate of 2,266 preventable deaths of non-elderly veterans in 2008. (See table.)

“Like other uninsured Americans, most uninsured vets are working people - too poor to afford private coverage but not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid or means-tested VA care,” said Dr. Steffie Woolhandler, a professor at Harvard Medical School who testified before Congress about uninsured veterans in 2007 and carried out the analysis released today [Tuesday]. “As a result, veterans go without the care they need every day in the U.S., and thousands die each year. It’s a disgrace.”

Dr. David Himmelstein, the co-author of the analysis and associate professor of medicine at Harvard, commented, “On this Veterans Day we should not only honor the nearly 500 soldiers who have died this year in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the more than 2,200 veterans who were killed by our broken health insurance system. That’s six preventable deaths a day.”

He continued: “These unnecessary deaths will continue under the legislation now before the House and Senate. Those bills would do virtually nothing for the uninsured until 2013, and leave at least 17 million uninsured over the long run. We need a solution that works for all veterans - and for all Americans - single-payer national health insurance.”

While many Americans believe that all veterans can get care from the VA, even combat veterans may not be able to obtain VA care, Woolhandler said. As a rule, VA facilities provide care for any veteran who is disabled by a condition connected to his or her military service and care for specific medical conditions acquired during military service.

Woolhandler said veterans who pass a means test are eligible for care in VA facilities, but have lower priority status (Priority 5 or 7, depending upon income level). Veterans with higher incomes are classified in the lowest priority group and are not eligible for VA enrollment.

*****
Some sources for possible patient stories are available upon request. Please contact Mark Almberg at (312) 782-6006 or mark@pnhp.org.

Physicians for a National Health Program (www.pnhp.org) is an organization of 17,000 doctors who support single-payer national health insurance, often called an improved Medicare for All. To speak with a physician/spokesperson in your area, visit www.pnhp.org/stateactions or call (312) 782-6006.



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Sources: Harvard Medical School, Huffington Post, Google Maps

Was US Military Partially Responsible For The 8 Soldiers Killed In Afghan's "Battle Of Wanat"?

(The fierce encounter – which erupted when insurgents stormed a pair of remote outposts near the Pakistan border – resulted in the heaviest U.S. loss of life in a single battle since 2008. NBC’s Jim Miklaszewski reports.)

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(As it relates to the war in Afghanistan Pres. Obama mulls his way forward.)

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Almost a Lost Cause


The rocket-propelled grenade and rifle fire was so intense that most of the soldiers spent the opening minutes of the battle lying on their stomachs, praying that the enemy would run out of ammunition.

They had been in the tiny Afghan village of Wanat, near the Pakistani border, for four days. The command post of their remote base was still just a muddy hole surrounded by sandbags.

The radio crackled. About 50 yards from the base's perimeter, nine U.S. soldiers manning an observation post were on the verge of being overrun. Several soldiers were already dead.

"We need to get up there!" screamed 1st Lt. Jonathan Brostrom, the platoon leader at the main base. He and Spec. Jason Hovater grabbed as much ammunition as they could carry and someone popped a yellow smoke grenade to cover their movement. The two soldiers sprinted into enemy fire.

It was a predictable reaction from the 24-year-old lieutenant -- courageous, reckless, impulsive. When Brostrom joined the military, his father, a retired colonel and career aviator, had tried to steer him away from the infantry and toward flying helicopters. "I don't want to be a wimp," the son chided his father.

Brostrom and Hovater dove into the observation post. A sergeant who was too hurt to fight handed Brostrom his M240 machine gun. As the lieutenant turned to set up the weapon, someone spotted an insurgent: "He's inside the [expletive] wire!"

Nine U.S. soldiers were killed and 27 were wounded during the July 13, 2008, attack, which raged for several hours and was one of the bloodiest of the Afghan war. Among the dead was Brostrom.

In recent months, the battle of Wanat has come to symbolize the U.S. military's missteps in Afghanistan. It has provoked Brostrom's father to question why Jonathan died and whether senior Army officers -- including a former colleague and close friend -- made careless mistakes that left the platoon vulnerable. It has triggered three investigations, the latest initiated last week by Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And it has helped drive a broader reassessment of war strategy among top commanders in Afghanistan, who have begun to pull U.S. troops out of remote villages where some of the heaviest fighting has occurred. Senior military leaders have concluded that they lack the forces to wrest these Taliban strongholds away from the enemy and are instead focusing on more populated and less violent areas.

To some soldiers and their families, this decision amounts to retreat.

A few weeks before Brostrom was killed, a military historian asked him about the successes he had witnessed in Nurestan province, where he had spent most of his tour. He gave a prescient reply.

"It is almost a lost cause up in Nurestan," he said flatly. "There needs to be a lot more than just a platoon there if you want to make a big difference." He thought some more about his frustrating tour, leading the 40-man 2nd Platoon of Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team. "We killed a few Taliban," he said, "so I guess that is a success."

Brostrom, who grew up on Army bases throughout the United States, was charming, athletic and a little bit immature. He arrived in Afghanistan in July 2007 and spent a couple of uneventful months in a battalion staff job before taking over a platoon that occupied a small outpost in Nurestan's Waygal Valley.

The outpost's location, near the tiny village of Bella, was chosen in 2006 because it sat on a historic mujaheddin infiltration route from Pakistan. The idea was to stop enemy fighters in the remote mountains before they made their way to more populated areas.

This account of Brostrom's time in Afghanistan and his final battle is based on interviews with his troops and commanders, as well as the Army's 800-page initial investigation. It also draws from the work of an Army historian whose draft study of the fight was reported by ForeignPolicy.com and The Washington Post in July.

Brostrom entered the war at a time when the Taliban was gaining strength. Shortly after he became platoon leader, his unit was sent to recover the bodies of six U.S. soldiers and a Marine who were gunned down while returning on foot to Bella. One soldier had fallen more than 500 yards down a steep ravine, and it had taken Brostrom's troops and circling attack helicopters more than 15 hours to find him.

After the attack, the other soldiers rarely ventured far from their base. "We felt like we'd been backed into a corner," said Staff Sgt. Jonathan Benton, one of the soldiers from the platoon. "Nothing ever felt safe out there."

In January 2008, Brostrom's platoon sergeant, Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Kahler, was fatally shot by an Afghan security guard as he returned to the outpost from a foot patrol. One of Kahler's jobs had been to teach Brostrom, who was technically his superior, how to lead troops in combat. On a cloudless day at the Bella outpost, Brostrom delivered a simple eulogy for his 29-year-old friend and mentor.

He talked about Kahler's love for his wife and 4-year-old daughter, his patience with young soldiers, and his passion for punk music. "I can't even begin to list all the good qualities Sergeant Kahler had, because it would be impossible," he said, squinting into the bright midday sun and fighting back tears. "I think Sergeant Kahler knew everything."

A Bloodbath

Brostrom's battalion commander, Lt. Col. William Ostlund, had concluded months before Kahler's death that keeping troops at the Bella outpost no longer made sense. Enemy fighters coming from Pakistan had long ago learned to maneuver around the base.

But Ostlund wasn't ready to give up the surrounding Waygal Valley, which was home to a largely illiterate and deeply religious population. The isolated valley offered an ideal haven for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. "It was a population I really had a hard time understanding and did not respect," Ostlund said. "But I really did believe that they needed to be connected to the central government and that would be the first step to making them better people, less of a threat to themselves and Afghanistan."

Ostlund, square-jawed and intense, had a reputation in the Army as a high flier. He enlisted at age 17 and earned his bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska in only four semesters. In the 1990s, he served as a platoon leader for then-Lt. Col. David H. Petraeus, who had risen to become the top commander in the Middle East. "Bill was one of those rare individuals who could truly inspire others," Petraeus recalled. "Whatever the task, his platoon stood out . . . and the tougher the task, the more they stood out." Ostlund went on to earn a master's degree in international relations from Tufts University and to teach at West Point.

He decided to relocate Brostrom's platoon from Bella to a new base at Wanat, which was home to the valley's district governor and police chief. The troops would establish a security bubble around the village and then win the support of local officials with $1.4 million in reconstruction projects.

Ostlund had lost eight soldiers in the Waygal Valley and had twice been ambushed there himself. But he thought that U.S. troops could win the allegiance of the people there. "Americans are hard to dislike for an extended period of time," he said. "I really believe that."

His plan was also animated by the same stubborn resolve that caught Petraeus's eye. "To accept defeat and have that population destroy my will to continue my mission just wasn't on the menu of options," he said.

Before Brostrom moved to Wanat, he went home on leave to see his parents in Hawaii, where they had settled after his father retired from the Army. One evening, he showed his father videos from Afghanistan. Most of the clips were of Brostrom and his troops under fire at the Bella outpost.

In one video, Brostrom's battalion fired artillery and white phosphorus, an incendiary weapon, at a distant campfire in the mountains where it had killed insurgents earlier that day. Someone had come to collect the bodies. The soldiers were determined to kill them.

"Here comes a mighty big explosion on this little candlelight ceremony that the Taliban is having for their buddies that died there earlier," one of the soldiers says on the video. "This is going to be glorious. It is going to be a bloodbath."

A few seconds later, the mountainside exploded with fire, and the soldiers let up a raucous cheer.

Human rights groups have criticized the United States for employing white phosphorus to kill enemy fighters, but this type of use is permitted under military rules. The elder Brostrom weighed his words carefully before he spoke. "How do you know those people dragging the bodies away weren't villagers coming to get their relatives?" he asked.

"They are all [expletive] Taliban up there," the son replied.

The father continued to press his doubts. The son maintained that the hard-nosed approach was the only thing keeping him alive in a hopeless corner of Afghanistan. Finally, the young lieutenant snapped. "You don't understand," he said.

"You're right, son. I don't," the father replied. "I don't understand it. But I am worried. I am really worried."

Nothing as Planned

A few days later, Brostrom returned to Afghanistan. His platoon didn't get its final order to establish the Wanat base until early July. The battalion was only two weeks from returning home, but Ostlund and his superiors wanted to make sure that the outpost was in place for the next unit.

The day before he left, Brostrom confessed his doubts about the mission to Lt. Brandon Kennedy, his closest friend in the Army. Brostrom worried he didn't have enough men to hold off an enemy attack and complained that the proposed base's location, surrounded by mountains, would make it hard to defend, Kennedy wrote in a statement for Army investigators.

"He said he knew he was going to get [expletive] up, because the last four times he had gone up there, he had been ambushed every time, often with very good effects," Kennedy wrote.

Nothing about the Wanat mission went as planned. Brostrom and his soldiers were supposed to have 16,000 pounds of construction material to build defensive bunkers, big earthmovers to fill seven-foot-tall Hesco barriers, and a five-day supply of water, a senior military official said.

But the Afghan construction firm that was supposed to ferry the construction supplies and build the base refused to make the four-mile drive into the valley because it was too dangerous. A small Bobcat earthmover was delivered to the base by helicopter, but it ran out of gas after one day. Brostrom's soldiers, working in 100-degree heat, chipped away at the rocky soil with shovels to fill sandbags and dirt barriers.

The five-day supply of water also never made it to Wanat, and by their second day at the base, most of the troops were "mildly dehydrated," one soldier told Army investigators.

Two days into the mission, a Predator surveillance drone -- one of only two in Afghanistan -- was shifted from Wanat. No attacks had occurred there during the opening days of the mission, and U.S. commanders decided there were more pressing priorities.

"There should have been a lot more done to help us," said Sgt. 1st Class David Dzwik, who replaced Kahler as Brostrom's platoon sergeant. "The real problem was arrogance. Everyone thought they knew the enemy."

This Was Going to Be It

A few days after the platoon arrived, a Wanat village elder gave Brostrom a list of Afghans who had been killed in a helicopter attack the previous week. The dead included insurgents but also several local medical personnel who had worked closely with U.S. soldiers. The incident had infuriated people throughout the valley.

On July 13, their fifth day at the Wanat base, Brostrom and Dzwik ordered all of the soldiers to rise at 3:30 a.m. and man their fighting positions. In Afghanistan, the hours just before dawn are typically the most deadly.

Shortly after 4 a.m., an estimated 200 insurgents let loose a torrent of rocket-propelled-grenade fire, destroying the base's anti-tank missile system and its mortar tubes. Then they trained their guns on the observation post.

The initial blast threw Spec. Tyler Stafford onto his back. He screamed that he was on fire. Next to him, Spec. Matthew Phillips was rearing back to throw a grenade when a rocket came roaring at them. The tailfin ricocheted off Stafford's helmet, leaving a jagged dent. When he looked up, Phillips was dead.

A few feet away, Spec. Christopher McKaig and Spec. Jonathan Ayers prodded each other to raise their heads above the observation post's sandbagged wall. "I am going to count to three and then we are both going to jump up and shoot at whatever we see," McKaig recalled screaming.

The two soldiers leapt to their feet, fired a short burst from their rifles and collapsed. When it came time to rise again, Ayers hesitated. So McKaig started counting. On three, the men rose and a bullet struck Ayers. He coughed up enough blood to fill a teaspoon and fell over dead.

A few minutes later, Brostrom and Hovater sprinted up to the observation post. They were killed within minutes of their arrival.

With the enemy closing in, Stafford, McKaig and Sgt. Matthew Gobble -- woozy from a loss of blood -- abandoned the observation post. In the chaos, they accidentally left behind Sgt. Ryan Pitts, who could hear the enemy fighters barking orders just a few feet away. He whispered into a radio that he was alone and out of ammunition.

"I knew this was going to be it," he later told an Army historian. Soldiers at the main base called to him over the radio, but Pitts didn't answer. The wounded sergeant couldn't afford to let the enemy hear him.

Another team of reinforcements sprinted to the observation post, pulled rifles and ammunition off their dead comrades, and fired back at the insurgents. An hour into the battle, Apache helicopters arrived and swung the momentum in favor of U.S. troops.

Brostrom's friend, Brandon Kennedy, arrived at Wanat a short time later to find soldiers coated in sweat and blood. Thick clouds of smoke spewed from burning Humvees. "I had been in firefights before, but this was totally different," he said. "It was like a movie."

It fell to Kennedy to escort Brostrom's body back to the United States. He asked a sergeant who had done it before what to expect.

"It is always the same," the soldier replied. "The moms just want to know about their son. They want to know what kind of man he was. The dads want to know how their son died. They want someone to explain to them what happened."



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NC-Based Corrupt Blackwater Was Paid To Participate In CIA Anti-Terrorist Program...However They Didn't Do Anything

NY Times, MSNBC---

(The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill comments on allegations made about Blackwater Worldwide from two former employees who claim the company was used to murder, smuggle weapons, destroy evidence and for wholesale corruption.)

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The Central Intelligence Agency in 2004 hired outside contractors from the private security contractor Blackwater USA as part of a secret program to locate and assassinate top operatives of Al Qaeda, according to current and former government officials.

Executives from Blackwater, which has generated controversy because of its aggressive tactics in Iraq, helped the spy agency with planning, training and surveillance. The C.I.A. spent several million dollars on the program, which did not capture or kill any terrorist suspects.

Current and former government officials said that the C.I.A.’s efforts to use paramilitary hit teams to kill Qaeda operatives ran into logistical, legal and diplomatic hurdles almost from the outset. These efforts had been run by the C.I.A.’s counterterrorism center, which runs operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks.

In 2002, Blackwater won a classified contract to provide security for the C.I.A. station in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the company maintains other classified contracts with the C.I.A., current and former officials said.

Over the years, Blackwater has hired several former top C.I.A. officials, including Cofer Black, who ran the C.I.A. counterterrorism center immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks.

C.I.A. operatives also regularly use the company’s training complex in North Carolina. The complex includes a shooting range used for sniper training.

An executive order signed by President Gerald R. Ford in 1976 barred the C.I.A. from carrying out assassinations, a direct response to revelations that the C.I.A. had initiated assassination plots against Fidel Castro of Cuba and other foreign politicians.

The Bush administration took the position that killing members of Al Qaeda, a terrorist group that attacked the United States and has pledged to attack it again, was no different from killing enemy soldiers in battle, and that therefore the agency was not constrained by the assassination ban.

But former intelligence officials said that employing private contractors to help hunt Qaeda operatives would pose significant legal and diplomatic risks, and they might not be protected in the same way government employees are.

Some Congressional Democrats have hinted that the program was just one of many that the Bush administration hid from Congressional scrutiny and have used the episode as a justification to delve deeper into other Bush-era counterterrorism programs.

But Republicans have criticized Mr. Panetta’s decision to cancel the program, saying he created a tempest in a teapot.

“I think there was a little more drama and intrigue than was warranted,” said Representative Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee.

Officials said that the C.I.A. program was devised partly as an alternative to missile strikes using drone aircraft, which have accidentally killed civilians and cannot be used in urban areas where some terrorists hide.

Yet with most top Qaeda operatives believed to be hiding in the remote mountains of Pakistan, the drones have remained the C.I.A.’s weapon of choice. Like the Bush administration, the Obama administration has embraced the drone campaign because it presents a less risky option than sending paramilitary teams into Pakistan.
The fact that the C.I.A. used an outside company for the program was a major reason that Leon E. Panetta, the new C.I.A. director, became alarmed and called an emergency meeting to tell Congress that the agency had withheld details of the program for seven years, the officials said.

It is unclear whether the C.I.A. had planned to use the contractors to capture or kill Qaeda operatives, or just to help with training and surveillance. American spy agencies have in recent years outsourced some highly controversial work, including the interrogation of prisoners. But government officials said that bringing outsiders into a program with lethal authority raised deep concerns about accountability in covert operations.

Officials said that the C.I.A. did not have a formal contract with Blackwater for this program but instead had individual agreements with top company officials, including the founder, Erik D. Prince, a politically connected former member of the Navy Seals and the heir to a family fortune. Blackwater’s work on the program actually ended years before Mr. Panetta took over the agency, after senior C.I.A. officials themselves questioned the wisdom of using outsiders in a targeted killing program.

Blackwater, which has changed its name, most recently to Xe Services, and is based in North Carolina, in recent years has received millions of dollars in government contracts, growing so large that the Bush administration said that it was a necessary part of its war operation in Iraq.

Excessive force?
It has also drawn controversy. Blackwater employees hired to guard American diplomats in Iraq were accused of using excessive force on several occasions, including shootings in downtown Baghdad in 2007 in which 17 civilians were killed. Iraqi officials have since refused to renew the company’s operating license.

Several current and former government officials interviewed for this article spoke only on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing details of a still classified program.

Paul Gimigliano, a C.I.A. spokesman, declined to provide details about the canceled program, but he said that Mr. Panetta’s decision on the assassination program was “clear and straightforward.”

“Director Panetta thought this effort should be briefed to Congress, and he did so,” Mr. Gimigliano said. “He also knew it hadn’t been successful, so he ended it.”

A Xe spokeswoman did not return calls seeking comment.

Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who leads the Senate Intelligence Committee, also declined to give details of the program. But she praised Mr. Panetta for notifying Congress. “It is too easy to contract out work that you don’t want to accept responsibility for,” she said.

The C.I.A. this summer conducted an internal review of the assassination program that recently was presented to the White House and the Congressional intelligence committees. The officials said that the review stated that Mr. Panetta’s predecessors did not believe that they needed to tell Congress because the program was not far enough developed.

The House Intelligence Committee is investigating why lawmakers were never told about the program. According to current and former government officials, former Vice President Dick Cheney told C.I.A. officers in 2002 that the spy agency did not need to inform Congress because the agency already had legal authority to kill Qaeda leaders.

One official familiar with the matter said that Mr. Panetta did not tell lawmakers that he believed that the C.I.A. had broken the law by withholding details about the program from Congress. Rather, the official said, Mr. Panetta said he believed that the program had moved beyond a planning stage and deserved Congressional scrutiny.

“It’s wrong to think this counterterrorism program was confined to briefing slides or doodles on a cafeteria napkin,” the official said. “It went well beyond that.”



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Sources: NY Times, MSNBC, Google Maps